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A state may lawfully resort to unilateral use of force outside of its
territory in the following circumstances:'
1) When it has been subjected to an armed attack on its territory, vessels or
military forces;
2) When the imminence of an attack is so clear and the danger so great that
the necessity of self-defense "is instant (and) overwhelming;"
3) When another state that has been subjected to an unlawful armed attack
by a third state requests armed assistance in repelling that attack;
4) When a third state has unlawfully intervened with armed force on one
side of an internal conflict and the other side has requested counter in-
tervention in response to the illegal intervention; or
5) When its nationals in a foreign country are in imminent peril of death or
grave injury and the territorial sovereign is unable or unwilling to pro-
tect them.
Of course, each of the foregoing grounds for use of force requires inter-
pretation to meet the particular conditions involved. A state may also be
authorized to resort to force by a decision of a competent international
organ pursuant to the United Nations Charter. Such action would fall
outside of the "unilateral" use of force.
I have understood the expression "unilateral use of force" to mean
coercive military action against a foreign government or an organized
insurgency movement. It would not apply normally to the provision of
military equipment, materials, training, or technical advice by one state
to another under an agreed arrangement. Questions as to the legal admis-
sability of such aid may arise if the recipient government faces an organ-
ized insurgency involving a substantial number of people or control over
significant areas of the country. In that circumstance, an external power
would not be entitled to assist either side with military means. Such
outside support involving armed force would be inimical to the right of
the people to decide for themselves the kind of government they want,
whether they do so by armed conflict or peaceful means. It would consti-
tute a use of force against the political independence of the state in ques-
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tion. In the event an illegal intervention should occur on one side or the
other, a counter-intervention is permissible (as stated in point four
above). It would be legally justifiable as a defense of the independence of
the state against a prior illegal intervention involving the use of force.
The permissible uses of force summarized above are all subject to the
requirements of necessity and proportionality. This presents the question
of whether force can be considered necessary if peaceful means are avail-
able to undo the wrong. Is there not always an overriding obligation to
seek peaceful settlement first? We cannot say there is. To require a state
to allow an attack to continue without resistance on the ground that
peaceful settlement should be sought first would nullify the right of self-
defense. It is enough that an armed attack has taken place to justify the
proportionate use of force as an immediate response. A state is not
obliged to turn the other cheek when attacked. A similar conclusion is
called for in case of an imminent threat to the lives of persons coupled
with unreasonable demands for concession.
The issue becomes more complicated when a significant period of time
has elapsed after an armed attack has succeeded in the capture of terri-
tory, property, or persons. Has a state whose territory was unlawfully
taken by armed force a continuing right to self-defense to recover that
territory? The element of time cannot be ignored. It is reasonable to
require a victim of aggression, no longer faced with the emergency of an
armed attack, to seek and exhaust all avenues of peaceful settlement. But
what if such avenues prove futile-is self-defense then "necessary"? I
suggest that the idea of self-defense contains a temporal element. It re-
fers to a response made close in time to the attack or imminent threat.
Without that limitation, self-defense would sanction armed attacks for
countless prior acts of aggression and conquest. It would completely
swallow up the basic rule against use of force. The difficulty of defining a
precise time limit-a statute of limitations, as it were-does not impugn
the basic idea. In most cases, irredentist demands for lost territory or
claims for restoration of the status quo ante are based on attacks that
occured many years, even decades, ago. To extend self-defense to such
cases is to stretch the notion of defense far beyond its essential sense of a
response to an attack or immediate threat of attack.
The requirement of proportionality is linked to necessity: acts done in
self-defense must not exceed in manner or aim the necessity provoking
them. This definition leaves room for difference in particular cases but
there is no mistaking its core meaning. A state subjected to an isolated
frontier incursion or attack on a naval vessel is not entitled to bomb the
cities of the offender or launch a massive invasion. State practice con-
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forms, by and large, to this principle of restraint in defense. Security
Council decisions have condemned defensive actions that were greatly in
excess of the provocation (as measured by scale of weaponry and relative
casualties) as illegal reprisals rather than legitimate self-defense. It does
not seem unreasonable, however, to allow a state victim of an attack to
retaliate with force beyond the immediate area of attack when that state
has good reason to expect a continuation of attacks from the same
source. Such action would not be merely "anticipatory" since prior at-
tacks took place; nor would it be a reprisal inasmuch as its prime motive
would be protective, not punitive.
Self-defense may also be lawful in response to a threat of attack that is
imminent, and the necessity "instant and overwhelming" (see point two
above). Some believe that this may leave too wide an area of apprecia-
tion by a threatened state; others are concerned that it does not take
sufficient account of a build-up of military force (and especially nuclear
weapons) that would on first strike destroy a victim's defensive capabil-
ity. Both concerns have substance. They reveal the inability of a general
legal principle to capture the full dimensions of the problem. More spe-
cific rules are required and regimes for their supervision. Some such re-
gimes have been established in treaties and by practices accepted as rules.
We must look to them and to future arrangements for restraints. On the
level of principle, it makes sense to recognize a norm that opposes the
preemptive resort to force and acknowledges the necessity of self-defense
when an attack is clearly imminent. The size and deployment of military
forces on a large scale involve implicit, if not explicit, threats of force.
To permit states that feel threatened to take defensive measures by pre-
emptive action would open up a wide area for unilateral force. Yet we
must acknowledge the possibility of a threat so immediate and massive as
to make it absurd to demand that the target state await the actual attack
before taking defensive measures. The formula suggested above (based
on Daniel Webster's response in the Caroline case2) comes closest to a
legal standard that meets the opposing concerns and has found support
in recent years.3
Finally, I would underline the importance of rejecting the contention
that force may be used unilaterally to achieve such laudable ends as free-
dom, self-rule and human rights. Admittedly that contention has consid-
erable appeal in face of the repression and brutality of governments in
many areas of the world. The inability of the United Nations and other
2. 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409 (1906).
3. See Security Council discussion in 1981, 36 U.N. SCOR (2285-88 mtgs.), U.N. Docs.
S/PV 2285-88 (1981).
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international agencies to achieve their proclaimed purposes and the ap-
parent ineffectiveness of moral suasion and diplomacy have contributed
to the feeling that force is a necessary instrument to attain the ends ar-
ticulated in the Charter of the United Nations.
Nonetheless, I would reject the interpretation that force may be used
for any of those objectives. That construction would deprive Article
2(4) of much of its intended meaning. It is contrary to the interpretation
given to that article by virtually all countries since the Charter entered
into force. The democratic states of the world have not claimed the right
to intervene with force to bring about freedom or self-rule for other coun-
tries. Such interventions as have taken place by them have been legally
justified on other grounds. The idea that wars waged in a good cause
such as democracy or human rights would not involve a violation of
territorial integrity or political independence requires an Orwellian con-
struction of these terms. It is no wonder that international lawyers and
governments generally have rejected that interpretation.
In the absence of effective international restraints on the use of force,
an exception for "good" or "just" wars would give wide latitude to indi-
vidual powers to decide on the legitimacy of force. Experience has
shown how readily more powerful states have used the pretext of a
higher good to impose their will and values on weaker states. The impli-
cations of this for international violence in a period of superpower con-
frontation and obscurantist rhetoric are ominous. This is hardly the time
to weaken the principal normative restraints against the unilateral use of
force. It is most improbable that the world can be made safe for democ-
racy and human rights through new wars or invasions of the weak by the
strong.
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